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THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
AND THE REGIONAL USE OF FORCE
Peter A. Jenkins t
I. INTRODUCTION
The legality of the use of force by regional organizations for humanitarian
reasons, otherwise known as humanitarian intervention, is a hotly contested issue.
The United Nations Charter specifically prohibits the use of force except in limited
circumstances, which do not literally include humanitarian intervention.1
However, regional organizations have consistently cited humanitarian intervention
as the basis for using force within sovereign states without the consent of the
United Nations Security Council or, sometimes, the consent of the government of
the state within which force is used.2  The consistent practice of these
organizations has resulted in a variety of legal justifications for the use of force,
ranging from creative interpretations of the Charter to notions of implied consent
from the Security Council.3
The Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS" or "the
Community"), a passive economic conglomerate of African nation states, and the
Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
("ECOMOG"), the paramilitary peacekeeping wing of ECOWAS, maintain a
significant role in the development of legal justifications for regional use of force.
Although the policy and actions of African nations has not typically been given
much deference in the international legal arena, ECOWAS's actions in Liberia and
Sierra Leone at a minimum establish consistent practice which can be used as
precedent for other regional organizations. However, ECOWAS's actions have
t B.S., Massachutsetts Institute of Technology (2001); J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law
(2007). The author would like to thank Professor Ved Nanda for providing academic inspiration and
intellectual guidance.
1. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; U.N. Charter art. 51.
2. See, for example, the NATO intervention within the former Yugoslavia; OAS intervention;
ECOWAS intervention within Liberia.
3. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 139 (2002) (describing the "law of
mitigation" as well as the alternative of reinterpretation).
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arguably begun the process of creating a sufficient legal basis for reinterpreting the
Charter to include implicit authorization under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter.4
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the validity of the legal justifications,
both official and theoretical, for ECOWAS's actions in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
as well as to assess the practical impact of these justifications for future use of
force, and to establish criteria for justification of humanitarian intervention with
regional action particularly in mind.
Human rights are an area of increasing concern to the international
community, and the repeated violation of human rights in incidents such as
Liberia, Somalia, Kosovo, and Darfur requires that the legal criteria for forceful
humanitarian intervention be substantially established. However, the criteria
should not only be aimed at protecting human rights, but also avoiding possible
misuse of the doctrine by states with alternative motives.'
II. BACKGROUND
An adequate understanding of the legal issues involved requires a proper
context of both the history and original intentions of ECOWAS as well as the
development of the use of force within the international law over time, in particular
the role of the U.N. Charter and various theoretical bases for force. Furthermore,
although not necessary, a moral understanding of humanitarian intervention allows
for greater perspective in analyzing the issues and may provide a greater insight
into the need for sound international law regarding humanitarian intervention.
A. Definition of Humanitarian Intervention
For this analysis, humanitarian intervention will be defined as an individual
state or collection of states interfering in the affairs of a foreign state through use
or presence of armed forces to prevent the violation of human rights. This
definition incorporates actions for the purposes of protecting a state's own citizens
abroad and protecting a foreign state's citizens from violations. Furthermore, the
term "human rights" includes any of the provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
6Genocide Convention.
B. History of ECOWAS
On May 28, 1975, fifteen West African countries signed the Treaty of Lagos
establishing ECOWAS.7 The original agreement was signed by Benin (formerly
4. Id.
5. For example, the Ugandan intervention in Angola was possibly motivated by long-standing
hostilities towards one another.
6. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A(III) (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm; Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260(111) (1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html.
7. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), May 28, 1975, 1010
U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter Treaty of Lagos] (founding treaty establishing ECOWAS).
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known as Dahomey), Burkina Faso (formerly known as Upper Volta), C6te
d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 8 Cape Verde joined the
community in 1976 as the 1 6th member and Mauritania left it at the end of 1999,
although at the time of the interventions all 16 members were still part of
ECOWAS. 9
The original intention of the Community comes from Article 2 of the Treaty
of Lagos. The stated purposes are "promot[ing] co-operation and development in
all fields of economic activity" as well as increasing the standard of living,
maintaining economic stability, and fostering closer relations between its member
states. 10 The Treaty established four main institutions including the Authority of
Heads of State and Government ("Authority"), which controls the executive
functions of the Community, and the Executive Secretariat, which controls the
daily operations." The bulk of the Treaty at Lagos deals with trade, tax, customs,
and monetary regulation in addition to future requirements of "harmonization" and
co-operation between member states. 12  Enforcement of the provisions of the
Treaty of Lagos is handled by the Tribunal of the Community, which can only
settle disputes between treaty parties, 13 The Authority, which can suspend
members from the Community, 14 and the Council of Ministers, which can impose
unspecified measures to remedy disparity between member states.15 Notably, a
military wing was not originally incorporated into the Treaty of Lagos, although
Article 4 does allow for creation of special commissions in the future. 16
ECOWAS soon realized the importance of military peace within the
Community. Three years after its inception, the Community issued the Protocol on
Non-Aggression which stated that it "cannot attain its objectives save in an
atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member States."' 7
The protocol reaffirms the prohibition on force in the U.N. Charter and extends the
prohibition to acts of "subversion, hostility, or aggression" against the territory or
political structure of member states. 18 The primary intentions of the protocol were
8. Id..
9. S.K.B. ASANTE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM 1N AFRICA I (Praeger Publishers
1986).
10. Treaty of Lagos, supra note 7, at art. 2.
11. Id. at art. 4.
12. Id. at arts. 30, 34-36.
13. Id. at art. 11 (Article II also allows the Tribunal to "'ensure the observance of law and justice
in the interpretation of the provisions").
14. Id. at art. 54 (Article 54 mentions suspension from participation in ECOWAS activities in
response to non-payment of required contributions).
15. Id. at art. 32 (Article 32 does not specify the types of measures to be used, only that the
measures should be "designed to promote the industrial development of Member States").
16. Id. at art. 4(1)(e) (enabling the Authority to create new commissions "as it deems necessary").
17. Protocol on Non-Aggression pmbl., Apr. 22, 1978, 1690 U.N.T.S. 39, available at
http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity-jo-union/pdfs/ecowas/14ProtNonAggre.pdf.
18. Id. at art. 2 (Article 2 augments the reaffirmation of the U.N. Charter located in the preamble).
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to require the use of peaceful means of dispute resolution' 9 and to prevent
foreigners from using a member state as a base for subverting other states.
20
The Protocol on Non-Aggression was supplemented in 1981 by the Protocol
Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence ("Mutual Defence Protocol"). The
Mutual Defence Protocol "firmly resolve[d]" to safeguard the sovereignty of
member states from foreign intervention. 21 Also, an element of collective defense
was added to ECOWAS by requiring mutual assistance against any armed threat
and defining that a threat against one member state constituted a threat against the
whole Community.22 Furthermore, the protocol established the framework for
collective intervention by creating the Allied Armed Forces of the Community
("AAFC"), a military force comprised of national units contributed by member
states, 23 and requiring action in two circumstances: failure of peaceful means of
settlement required by the Protocol on Non-Aggression; or "[iun case of internal
armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from
outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community. 24
Although the plain language of the protocol appears to authorize intervention in
internal conflicts such as civil wars that are externally supported, this type of
intervention is tempered by the need for a legitimate territorial defense of a
member state as well as the extension of the conflict outside of "purely internal"
bounds.25
The final step towards the use of military force by ECOWAS was the creation
of the Community Standing Mediation Committee ("SMC") in May of 1990 in
reaction to the crisis in Liberia. The SMC was comprised of the Chairman of the
Authority (represented by Captain Blaise Compaore of Gambia) with Ghana, Mali,
Nigeria, and Togo as elected representatives.26 The Authority formed the SMC to
initiate mediation procedures for countries in conflict, but by the inception of the
intervention in Liberia the SMC acted on behalf of the Authority in initiating
intervention under the Mutual Defence Protocol.
27
19. Id. at art. 5.
20. Id. at art. 4.
21. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence pmbl., May 29, 1981, 1690 U.N.T.S. 51,
available at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity-to-union/pdfs/ecowas/13ProtMutuaiDefAss.pdf
[hereinafter Mutual Defence Protocol].
22. Id. at arts. 2-3.
23. Id. at art. 13 (limited by the occurrence of "any armed intervention" in Article 13).
24. Id. at art. 4 (subject to a prior decision by the Authority of Heads of State and Government
after collaborating with the member state involved).
25. Id. at arts. 15, 18 (Article 15 requires the territorial defense while Article 18 prohibits
intervention into internal conflicts).
26. ECOWAS, Authority Decision A/DEC. 9/5/90, 21 O.J. ECOWAS Spec. Supp. 5 (1992),
[hereinafter Founding SMC Decision], reprinted in UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH CENTRE
FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE
LIBERIAN CRISIS 38-39 (M. Weller ed., 1994) [hereinafter REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING RESEARCH];
ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA 51 (2002).
27. See ECOWAS, SMC Decision A/DEC. 1/8/90, On the Cease-Fire and Establishment of an
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, , 21 O.J. ECOWAS Spec. Supp. 6 (1992)
[hereinafter Founding ECOMOG Decision], reprinted in REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING RESEARCH, supra
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C. Brief History of the Use of Force
1. Force Prior to the U.N. Charter
The justifications for the use of force were relatively static up until the First
World War, but the extent of that conflict and its impact on world opinion
regarding force acted as a catalyst for change which resulted in initial yet
unsuccessful measures that were solidified by the reaction to the Second World
War. Historically, the main use of force was war and the primary justification was
the Just or Holy War, which utilized divine will as the objective measurement for
the validity of war.28 The main flaw with this doctrine was the fact that both states
to a conflict could invoke divine will as justification for their own position.29
Gradually, the doctrine of positivism displaced the Just War with the notion
of sovereignty, which was later "codified" by the Treaty of Westphalia.3 °
Sovereignty is the current fundamental basis for international law which entails
three significant rights: the government of a state maintains sole authority over the
state, every state is juridically equivalent, and no higher law binds states without
their consent. 31 Furthermore, sovereignty included a competence de guerre, a right
to war, which was wholly separate from any valid justification. Consequently, the
fact that states could go to war became the justification for actually going to war,
regardless of the moral or ethical bases.32
Two other doctrines that accompanied the right to war were reprisals and self-
defense. Both doctrines are forms of force on a lesser scale than war, and both
doctrines are limited by necessity and proportionality.33 Reprisals are reactions to
violations of international law after a demand for redress has gone unmet, and is
embodied within the Naulilaa decision against Germany.3 4  Self-defense was
classically described in the Caroline case by then Secretary of State Daniel
Webster as the acceptable use of force in the absence of a prior violation of law as
long as the "necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.,
35
The mass casualties and the broad geographic scope of the First World War
altered the common perceptions on force and led to initial measures to prevent its
use. The League of Nations was formed and implemented a form of dispute
resolution designed to impose a "cooling off' period on states in order to prevent
note 26, at 67-69; Mutual Defence Protocol, supra note 21, at arts. 2-3.
28. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 11-12 (1993).
29. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 778-79 (4th ed. 1997) (referring to the
drawback as the "paradox of wars between Christian states").
30. AREND, supra note 28, at 15-16.
31. Id. at 16.
32. See id. at 17.
33. See id. at 17-18.
34. Id. at 17. See also Naulilaa (Germany v. Port.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1012, 1019 (1928), reprinted in L.
C. GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE CASES 679, 680 (4th ed. 1978).
35. AREND, supra note 28, at 18. See also JOHN BASSETr MOORE, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 412 (1906) (discussing the Caroline incident between Canada and the United States).
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
36
emotional reactions. However, the League only imposed two procedural
restrictions on the use of force, namely that states must wait three months before
acting and that force was prohibited if a state complied with all arbitral decisions.
37
The other major advance after the First World War was the Kellogg-Briand
Pact which took the significant steps of condemning the recourse to war and
renouncing war as an "instrument of national policy," which refuted the
longstanding notion of competence de guerre.38 The Pact gained broad acceptance
as binding customary law, but it also failed to realize any significant enforcement
applications and only addressed the use of war, which left open the option for
measures short of war. 39 However, the Pact had a significant impact on jus ad
bellum and other reasons for force used in future incidents.40 Ultimately, neither
the League of Nations nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact yielded the desired result, as
the Second World War broke out within a decade of these advances.
2. Legal Justifications for Intervention under the U.N. Charter
At the conclusion of the Second World War, a delegation of forty-nine states
met in San Francisco to draft the Charter of the United Nations. The primary
purposes of the Charter were to establish international norms regulating state
behavior and create an organization to ensure compliance with the Charter as well
as maintain peace among the states. 4' The legally binding nature of the Charter
results both from treaty law and customary law,42 and although the application of
the latter is a matter of debate, the practical significance is inconsequential to this
analysis because every member of ECOWAS is a member of the United Nations.43
The imposed norm regarding the use of force, however, was emphatic - any
"threat or use of force" against the territorial or political integrity of a state was
prohibited except in self-defense or in reaction to a "threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression." 44 Essentially, the Charter established a two-tier
system on the use of force: the upper being a structure for an ideal world in which
no state would initiate conflict; and the lower allowing for individual or collective
response by states in the event the U.N. is unable or unwilling to act.45 The latter
scenario significantly affects the justifications for humanitarian intervention when
combined with the express authorization of regional organizations to act
"consistent[ly] with the Purposes" of the Charter. 46
36. See AREND, supra note 28, at 19-20; League of Nations Covenant art. 12.
37. League of Nations Covenant arts. 12, 15.
38. Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
39. See AREND, supra note 28, at 23-24.
40. Id. at 24.
41. U.N. Charter pmbl.
42. See AREND, supra note 28, at 30 (describing the broad acceptance of the U.N. Charter as
imposing customary law subject to state practice and opiniojuris, the intention to be legally bound).
43. U.N. List of Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.
44. U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39, 51.
45. FRANCK, supra note 3, at 3.
46. U.N. Charter art. 52(1).
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The lower tier is comprised of the Article 51 and Article 106 exceptions to the
prohibition on force and it gives rise to problems of interpretation.47 Initial
ambiguity resulted from the Article 2(4) phrase "against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state' 48 as to whether it was a simple rephrasing of
"all use of force is prohibited" or whether there are acceptable uses of force which
do not affect the territorial integrity of the state. A rather larger and more
significant ambiguity, however, lies in tl-e meaning of "armed attack," which is the
essential criteria for invocation of the Article 51 self-defense exception to the
prohibition on force.49 The ambiguity in "armed attack" has given rise to a variety
of legal justifications for force based on creative interpretations of Article 51,
including protection of citizens abroad and humanitarian intervention. 50
Protection of citizens abroad has a sound legal foundation but is subject to
substantial criticism. 51 The principle is based upon an obligation of each state to
protect its own citizens and the theory that state sovereignty is trumped by the
obligation in certain circumstances, such as proportionately controlled action by a
state with genuinely protective motives responding to a serious threat to its
citizens.5 2 However, use of the principle is tempered by the criticism that it allows
strong states to disrupt the affairs of weaker states with relative impunity. 53
Consequently, states are hesitant to use the protection principle as a justification
for humanitarian use of force.
Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, is absent a historical legal basis
but enjoys the benefit of rising popularity among states and regional organizations
as enforcement of justice. Two typical rationales put forth as bases for
humanitarian intervention are: specific violations of human rights are also
violations of international treaty agreements which warrant "self-help" by other
parties to the agreement; 54 or that circumstances that accompany gross human
rights violations, particularly the mass flow of refugees across state borders,
47. See FRANCK, supra note 3, at 3 (identifying the composition of the "lower tier"); see also
AREND, supra note 28, at 35 (pointing out the interpretation problems). Article 106 analysis is not
considered in this analysis because it relates specifically to U.N. Security Council members, none of
which are parties to ECOWAS.
48. U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see also AREND, supra note 28, at 36 (theorizing that it is possible to
use force within another state without affecting its territorial integrity).
49. See AREND, supra note 28, at 36; U.N. Charter art. 51.
50. FRANCK, supra note 3, at 52 (including additional justifications of terrorism, ideological
subversion, and anticipatory defense, which are not considered in this analysis). For the purposes of
this analysis the term "humanitarian intervention" refers solely to saving another state's citizens, as it
can be confusing to refer to action on behalf of a state's own citizens as humanitarian intervention,
although both are intended to rescue people.
51. See id. at 76-77 (terming the use of the doctrine "problematic").
52. Id. at 96 (classifying the protection of citizens as ranging from "technically illegal" but
mitigated by circumstances to an adaptive concept of self-defense depending upon the breadth of
interpretation).
53. Id. at 76-77.
54. See id. at 135 (pointing out the limitation that the violations of human rights must be
specifically expressed in agreements such as the Genocide Convention or the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights).
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constitute a threat to the peace which warrants unilateral or collective response in
the absence of U.N. action. 55 Furthermore, renowned legal scholar Professor Ved
P. Nanda has developed five criteria for establishing the validity of humanitarian
intervention:
(1) [T]he necessity criterion, whether there was genocide or gross,
persistent, and systematic violations of basic human rights;
(2) the proportionality criterion, the duration and propriety of the force
applied;
(3) the purpose criterion, whether the intervention was motivated by
humanitarian consideration, self-interest, or mixed motivations;
(4) whether the action was collective or unilateral; and
(5) whether the intervention maximized the best outcome.
56
The principles of citizen protection and humanitarian intervention compose
the primary legal justifications traditionally cited for use of force involving
humanitarian goals. However, there is a significant obstacle to intervention
located in Article 2(7), which prohibits intervention into "matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 57 The loophole in this
principle is that it "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII.9, 58  Consequently, states wishing to act can put forth two
arguments to counter Article 2(7). A state may concede that 2(7) does apply and
then invoke Article 51 or some other Chapter VII article. Alternatively, a state
may argue that 2(7) does not apply because the violations of human rights are on a
scale which precludes the situation from being "essentially within" the failing
state. 5'
Another limitation on regional humanitarian intervention is the need for
Security Council consent before using force in an "enforcement action. ' ' 60 At least
one legal scholar, Professor John Moore, has argued that regional intervention into
internal conflicts at the request of the prevailing government does not rise to the
level of an enforcement action because the force is not directed against any
particular government. 61  However, this notion is contrary to the well-founded
principle of self-determination, which mandates that the people of a state should be
allowed to determine their own government, even forcefully if necessary.62 A
55. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (stating the flow of refugees across
borders "threaten[s] international peace and security in the region").
56. Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies In Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia - Revisiting the
Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law- Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L & POL'Y
827, 827-28 (1998).
57. U.N. Charter art. 2(7).
58. Id.
59. See FRANCK, supra note 3, at 41 (textually the action is still prohibited, but practically force is
acceptable when civil conflict "exceeds certain levels of virulence").
60. U.N. Charter art. 53(1).
61. AREND, supra note 28, at 63.
62. Id. at 40 (noting that aiding self-determination is sometimes used as a justification for force,
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second, albeit tenuous, method of satisfying Article 53 would be through the
General Assembly and the powers granted by the Uniting for Peace Resolution,
which allowed the General Assembly to make recommendations on the presence of
a threat or breach of the peace in the event the Security Council is unable to act
due to political veto constraints.63 Arguably, if the Security Council is deadlocked,
the General Assembly could be used as a substitute authority to grant consent for
regional action based on the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 
64
In conclusion, the optimal method to approaching humanitarian intervention
is by treating the principle as textually illegal but increasingly acceptable as a
compromise between peace and justice, whose validity depends upon the
circumstances. 65  The moral justifications for humanitarian intervention also
bolster the "justice" argument, which was a concern for the original drafters of the
Charter.
D. Moral Justification for Humanitarian Intervention
The strongest argument establishing a connection between morality and law,
particularly in the areas of human rights and use of force, is that the law regarding
these areas cannot be invoked until a sufficient moral argument has been
established.66 Accordingly, a variety of approaches have arisen to establish the
moral basis, including policy and natural rights arguments. The policy argument is
best described by the New Haven approach as written by Professor Myres S.
McDougal.67 This approach includes clarification of general community goals and
description of past trends to or away from realization of those goals. 68 The New
Haven approach is quite applicable to the area of human rights, because the
documents described supra in note 6 clearly evidence the "community goal" of
preservation of human rights.69 Conversely, the regard for this goal is somewhat
diminished when juxtaposed with the fact that the U.N. Charter favors peace over
justice in its actual text.
However, an analysis of past trends restores the argument. At the time of
drafting, the international community was recovering from an extended period of
violent unrest. Logically, the states' primary concern was peace, but as peace has
i.e. helping the rebels).
63. See G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 302nd Plen. Mtg., , A/RES/377(V) (Nov. 3,
1950).
64. See FRANCK, supra note 3, at 35 (describing the understanding that the resolution could
"empower the Assembly to deploy military force").
65. Id. at 138-139.
66. FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 12-13 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that "no 'purposive' interpretation of article 2(4) will be
convincing or indeed possible" without the existence of a moral right).
67. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 367-68 (1980).
68. Id. at 423-24 (additional criteria include assessment of past conditions, projection of future
developments, and evaluation of alternatives).
69. Compare to terrorism and the old saying, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter." Adam Brown, It's Not Power That Corrupts But Fear, SKY NEWS (Sept. 25, 2007),
http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30000-1285561,00.html).
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become a sustained norm in the international community, a trend towards
recognition of human rights justice over peace has emerged. The interpretation of
the law should adjust accordingly.
III. INTERVENTIONS
A. Liberia (1990)
ECOWAS's actions in Liberia are the most important to the legal discussion
of regional humanitarian intervention. Not only was the use of force in Liberia the
first of its kind by sub-regional "economic community," but also the lack of initial
U.N. authorization and the subsequent U.N. response provide significant precedent
for future interventions by humanitarian-motivated regional organizations.
1. Action Taken
The stage was set for a civil war in Liberia when Samuel Doe, an ethnic
Krahn, stole elections in 1985 and subsequently engaged in brutal repression of
both political opposition and independent activity. 7 0 The inevitable civil war
broke out on December 24, 1989, when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
("NPFL"), led by a Liberian ex-patriot named Charles Taylor, invaded Liberia
from the Ivory Coast. The Armed Forces of Liberia ("AFL") responded by
conducting a bloody counterinsurgency campaign which included indiscriminate
killing, raping, burning, and looting. The NPFL also engaged in egregious acts by
targeting the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups as suspected supporters of Doe's
government. The violence both forced refugees, numbering in the hundreds of
thousands, to flee to neighboring states and trapped hundreds of foreign state
citizens in the Liberian capital of Monrovia.7' Mediation attempts by the Liberian
Council of Churches failed and a second rebel fraction broke away from the NPFL
to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia ("INPFL"), headed by
Prince Yomie Johnson.7 2 The NPFL had reached Monrovia by summer 1990 and
the atrocities by both sides had reached substantial levels when President Doe
requested aid from both the United States and ECOWAS.73
The United States refused broad intervention, despite its historical ties to
Liberia, calling the civil war a "Liberian responsibility., 74  The Standing
Mediation Committee of ECOWAS, on the other hand, invoked the Mutual
Defence Protocol in passing a resolution calling for a cease-fire and establishing a
military force monitoring group (ECOMOG) comprised of national troops from
70. Liberia Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights,
AFRICA WATCH (Human Rts. Watch, ), June 1993, at 5-6.
71. Id. at 6-7 (160,000 refugees fled within a month of the attack, which escalated to over 700,000
constituting one third of Liberia's population).
72. ABIODUN ALAO, THE BURDEN OF COLLECTIVE GOODWILL 36 (1998).
73. REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING RESEARCH, supra note 26, at xxi.
74. Hearing on U.S. Policy and the Crisis in Liberia before the Subcomm. on Africa of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 10 1st Cong. (1991) (statement of Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of
State), reprinted in REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 43, 46. The U.S. did
intervene in Monrovia to extract approximately 1,000 foreign nationals, but insisted it was not
intervening in the Liberian conflict. AREND, supra note 28, at 102-103.
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Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone (with the majority coming
from Nigeria). 75 ECOMOG entered Liberia in August 1990 without any external
authorization except a plea from Doe, whose legitimacy was questionable given
that Taylor's NPFL controlled all of the territory outside of Monrovia at the time.
76
The mandate of the intervention was to install and protect an interim government
until free elections could be held. 77
The initial intervention was a success. The bloody conflict in Monrovia was
stopped, the Interim Government of National Unity ("IGNU") was installed, and a
cease-fire was agreed to by all factions by November 1990.78 An uneasy peace
was in place and diplomatic relations resulted in the Yamoussoukro IV agreement
to disarm and encamp all soldiers, although Taylor remained openly hostile to
ECOMOG and its Nigerian influence.79 Significant steps towards peace were
made in early 1992, including the formation of an ad hoc Supreme Court, the
opening of the University of Liberia, and the selection of an Interim Elections
Commission in preparation for elections.8 °
Unfortunately, the cease-fire was broken by a third group called the United
Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia ("UNLIMO") which was
composed mainly of former ALF members. 81 The attack resulted in renewed war
as Taylor attacked ECOMOG positions around Monrovia on a consistent basis as
part of "Operation Octopus. ' 82 ECOMOG was forced to ally itself with the AFL
and ULIMO against Taylor's NPFL, which cast serious doubts on the intentions of
ECOMOG as the AFL and ULIMO both held terrible records regarding
humanitarian intervention. 83  The final significant use of force aspect of the
ECOMOG intervention was the use of Nigeria's Alpha jets to strike targets in
Taylor's territory, which gave rise to allegations of ECOMOG's intention to attack
hospitals and a reaffirmance of the principle of "medical neutrality" by the U.N.
General Assembly. 84
Multiple peace agreements were reached between the warring factions as
conflict continued for another decade after the failure of the initial cease-fire. On
July 25, 1993, the three rebel factions signed the Cotonou Peace Accord
establishing joint enforcement of the peace by ECOMOG and a U.N. Observer
Mission ("UNOMIL") as well as a Council of State comprised of members of the
factions to control the Liberian executive powers.85 The inclusion of UNOMIL
75. Founding ECOMOG Decision, supra note 27, at 67; See also AFRICA WATCH, supra note 70,
at 7 (reporting that troops from Mali and Senegal joined the force after the initial intervention).
76. See AFRICA WATCH, supra note 70, at 7-9.
77. ALAO, supra note 72, at 53-54.
78. AFRICA WATCH, supra note 70, at 8.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Id. at 15-16.
85. Kofi Oteng Kufor, Recent Development: Developments in the Resolution of the Liberian
Conflict, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 373, 385 (1994).
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was a significant departure from the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, which gave
ECOMOG sole responsibility for regional enforcement.8 6 Subsequently, in fall
1994 the factions agreed on yet another peace accord called the Akosombo
Agreement, which primarily prohibited the formation of new rebel factions and
restated ECOMOG's responsibilities in conformity with Security Council
Resolutions 788 and 813.87 Elections were subsequently held in 1997 in which
Charles Taylor took 75% of the vote, ECOMOG finally withdrew from Liberia in
October 1999, and the end of the conflict finally occurred in 2003 when Charles
Taylor handed over the presidency to his vice president, Moses Blah.
2. Justification and Response
The intervention in Liberia clearly rose to the level of an enforcement action,
and ECOWAS lacked any sort of U.N. authorization when it intervened in Liberia,
making its intervention technically illegal under Charter Articles 53(1) and 2(4).
However, the President of the Security Council "commend[ed] the efforts made by
the [ECOWAS] head of State and Government to promote peace and normalcy in
Liberia" in January 1991,88 and the Security Council again praised ECOWAS for
addressing this "threat to international peace and security" after the cease fire was
broken in 1992.89 Furthermore, the Security Council requested all other states to
"respect the measures established by ECOWAS." 90 Consequently, it is possible to
view the U.N.'s lack of condemnation for ECOWAS's actions as subsequent
ratification or possibly even as implied consent which satisfies the Article 53(1)
requirement. A more narrow interpretation of the U.N. praise is that while the
actions were technically illegal, the negative response was mitigated by the
positive intentions and outcome. 91
ECOWAS justified its intervention through Article 18 of the Protocol
Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, which allowed intervention into
internal affairs which are substantially supported externally.92 Possible conflicts
with U.N. Charter Article 2(7) and OAU charter Article 3(2) seriously undermine
the validity of this argument, 93 but the OAU gave ECOWAS its unwavering
86. Id.
87. Id. at 391.
88. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2974th mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/22133 (1991).
89. See S.C. Res. 788, pmbl., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992).
90. Id. 10..
91. See FRANCK, supra note 3, at 139 (describing the "law of mitigation" as well as the alternative
of reinterpretation).
92. ALAO, supra note 72, at 59; see also Mutual Defense Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 4. The
NPFL was supported by both Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast.
93. Compare U.N. Charter art. 2(7) (prohibiting force when conflicts are "essentially within" a
state), and Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (June 27) (holding
that armed assistance of rebels, while constituting interference with another state's affairs, does not
constitute an "armed attack" for which force is appropriate), and Charter of the Organization of African
Unity art. 3(2), May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (requiring non-interference with internal affairs), with
Mutual Defense Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 18(2).
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support during the initial stages of intervention 94 and the Security Council did not
bother to even discuss the conflict in Liberia until the statement by the Security
Council President endorsing the efforts of ECOWAS. 95  However, a more
significant criticism of the ECOMOG intervention was that it interfered with the
Liberian peoples' right to self-determination when it forcibly prevented the
successful takeover by Taylor's NPFL.96 Unfortunately, no satisfactory response
was given to this criticism, the previous assertions of authority under Article 18 of
the Mutual Defence Protocol notwithstanding.
The most notable aspect of ECOMOG's use of force was the fact that despite
the mass atrocities being perpetrated by both the AFL and the NPFL, human rights
concerns were never cited as the primary justification for intervention, 97 although
the Nigerian delegate to the U.N. emphasized the purpose of intervention as "to
stop the senseless killing of innocent civilian nationals and foreigners. '  Instead,
the primary concern was peace in the region.99 This choice of justification sets up
the ironic situation where the intention was more in line with the original purposes
of the U.N. Charter than humanitarian concerns, but the intention also made the
action increasingly illegal because maintenance of peace and security falls squarely
with the Security Council, the intervention for peace is clearly controlled by the
provisions of the Charter, and authorization by the Security Council was required.
Comparatively, humanitarian intervention is possibly not always governed by the
Charter because the considerations for justice outweigh the prohibitions on force,
which persuades legal scholars to apply the loopholes discussed in Part II(C)(ii) of
this analysis because it is the "right" thing to do.
The U.N. response to the Liberian crisis and the subsequent intervention was
limited for a number of reasons. The most probable reason for U.N. inaction was
the common perception of the Liberian crisis as an internal civil war conflict,
100
which is supported by the U.S. response to Doe's request for aid. 101 Preoccupation
with the situation occurring in the Middle East (the Coalition was defending
Kuwait in the first Gulf War) is another plausible reason. Despite these reasons for
inaction, the Security Council became active in November 1992, albeit almost
three years after the inception of the conflict, by passing Resolution 788.102 The
resolution imposed an embargo of all military equipment to Liberia except for
ECOWAS and condemned all attacks on the ECOWAS peace force. The Security
94. See REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING RESEARCH, supra note 26, at xxii.
95. AREND, supra note 28, at 65.
96. See ECOMOG: Peacekeeper or Participant?, BBC NEWS, Feb. 11, 1998, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/55719.stm.
97. See AFRICA WATCH, supra note 70, at 26 (only one ECOWAS communiqu6 "even mentioned
human rights concerns").
98. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR Doc. S/21485 (1990), reprinted in REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING
RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 75-76.
99. AFRICA WATCH, supra note 70, at 26.
100. AREND, supra note 28, at 65.
101. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
102. S.C. Res. 788, supra note 89.
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Council acted again in March 1993 in passing Resolution 813.103 Some interesting
additions to Resolution 813 included U.N. contribution to the Liberian situation




Ultimately, however, the crucial aspects of the U.N. response to the ECOWAS
intervention lie in the initial praise given to ECOWAS despite the apparent illegal
nature of the action.
B. Sierra Leone (1997)
The intervention in Sierra Leone had a distinctly different flavor from the
intervention in Liberia. The token role of ECOWAS as compared to Nigeria
significantly diminished the "regional" aspect of the enforcement, although
ultimately the intervention was well received by the international community.
1. Action Taken
Sierra Leone struggled with a history of authoritative regimes and civil
disputes prior to and throughout the 1990's until the democratically-elected
government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was able to secure a temporary peace
through the Abidjan Accord. 105 The Accord provided for the end of a five year
civil war instigated by the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF"), as well as the
transformation of the RUF from a military operation to a political party in
opposition to the Sierra Leone People's Party ("SLPP") and the deployment of
international observers and peacekeepers within Sierra Leone.1 0 6 U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan responded to an indication by Kabbah's government that
Sierra Leone lacked sufficient forces to ensure peace by proposing a $47 million
peacekeeping operation spanning eight months. 1
07
Problems arose when the Security Council failed to adopt the Secretary
General's report due to concerns of U.S. approval. 10 8 The Abidjan Accord fell
apart because the RUF rebels refused to disarm and Sierra Leone's national army
lacked the capacity to enforce compliance with the Accord.109 Consequently, on
May 25, 1997, rebel soldiers took over government buildings and prisons in the
capital of Freetown and released Major Johnny Paul Koromah, the leader of the
RUF who was imprisoned for prior attempted coup. 110 Koromah declared himself
103. S.C. Res. 813, U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (Mar. 26, 1993).
104. Id. 114-15, 18.
105. Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECO WAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
321, 325-26 (1998); see also Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Nov. 30, 1996, R.U.F.-Sierra Leone,
http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html [hereinafter Abidjan Accord].
106. Abidjan Accord, supra note 105, at arts. 1, 12-13.
107. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone, delivered to the
Security Counsel, U.N. Doe. S/1997/80 (Jan. 26, 1997).
108. Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 105, at 326 (noting that the Clinton Administration was
engaged in sensitive budget negotiations with Congress at the time, which acted as a substantial
deterrent for any notion of engaging in any African peacekeeping process).
109. See id. at 326-27 (noting the inability of the national army was exacerbated by soldiers
defecting to the RUF due to lack of wages and racism).
110. Id. at 327.
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as the head of government and suspended the constitution.11 President Kabbah
had only been in power for fourteen months before being forced into exile in
neighboring Guinea. 
112
The Nigerian government responded immediately under the auspices of
ECOWAS. Nigeria already had peacekeeping troops positioned within Sierra
Leone during the civil war period, and Nigeria responded to the military coup
d'etat with the consent of President Kabbah. Nigeria engaged in all out combat
against RUF, using additional troops and shelling rebel targets in Freetown with
warships.1 1 3 The RUF withstood these initial uses of force, and West African
nations resorted to mediation to restore the democratic government.
An apparent breakthrough occurred in October 1997 when both President
Kabbah and Major Koromah signed the Conakry peace agreement.1 1 4  The
agreement called for the immediate disarmament of the RUF and restoration of
Kabbah as head of state within six months. Unfortunately, during this period the
human rights situation deteriorated substantially. The Kamajors, a rural militia
fighting against the RUF, initiated several attacks which caused a vicious response
by the RUF including some of the worst state-sponsored atrocities ever in Sierra
Leone." 5  With two months remaining on the Conakry agreement timeline,
Nigeria ousted Major Koromah's military junta. The release of Freetown resulted
from a nine-day offensive under the auspices of ECOMOG, which was well
received by both the Sierra Leone population and the international community. 1
6
2. Justification and Response
The main justifications put forth by ECOWAS and the Nigerian government
for the use of force were: the right to self-defense, the appeal by President Kabbah
seeking ECOWAS assistance, the atrocities committed by junta troops against
Sierra Leonean citizens, the threat to international peace and security in the region
caused by the flow of Sierra Leonean refugees to neighboring countries, and the
prevention of the execution of "atrocities" by the junta. 117 These reasons are a
substantial departure from the justifications used in the Liberian intervention in
that incorporation of the humanitarian aspects of the conflict is primary, while the
need for peace and restoration of order is not. Furthermore, the final justification
hints of a preemptive defense of human rights, which has certainly not gained
acceptance in the international community. Additional criticisms of the legality of
this intervention include the fact that Kabbah had already been expelled from the
country, making the legitimacy of his request for outside intervention more
uncertain than Doe's Liberian government, and the fact that the Security Council
111. Id.
112. Id. at 325.
113. Id. at 327.
114. Id. at 328-29.
115. See id. at 329 (noting most the atrocities were concentrated around the southern town of Bo).
116. Id. at 330.
117. Id. at 349-50.
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had passed a resolution which did not authorize force while addressing the issue,
essentially removing implied consent as a justification. 118
The U.N. sent conflicting messages in its reaction to the intervention. The
U.N. passed Resolution 1132 in October 1997, which condemned the human rights
violations in Sierra Leone and declared the conflict was a threat to the peace.
119
The resolution also imposed oil and arms embargos on Sierra Leone as well as
invited intervention by ECOWAS. 120 However, ECOWAS was limited to "strict
implementation" of the embargo and full enforcement powers were absent from
the resolution, which could imply the Security Council did not want force used to
restore democracy.12 1  Ironically, Nigerian forces acting under ECOWAS had
already used substantial force in the absence of Security Council authorization, and
those forces initiated armed conflict again after the resolution. 12 2 The conflicted
aspect of the U.N. reaction came in the form of a statement issued after the
restoration of Kabbah's government that welcomed "the fact that the military junta
has been brought to an end" and commended "the important role" that the
ECOWAS played in the "peaceful resolution" of the crisis. 123 Similar to Liberia,
the U.N. post facto ratified the seemingly illegal use of force by ECOWAS despite
the subtle mandate against force in Resolution 1132.
However, the answer to the enigma may lie with the fact that the political
basis for intervention was quite sound. The displacement of a peaceful, legitimate,
and democratic government through a military coup that utilizes mass human
rights violations as a combat technique 2 4 is the epitome of why the U.N. prohibits
the use of force and such a coup certainly holds no logical connection to self-
determination.
Additionally, the ECOWAS justification of self-defense appears to legitimate
for two reasons. First, the intervention by ECOMOG was in reaction to an attack
by RUF forces on an ECOMOG military camp at Lungi, and simply because the
troops were stationed within Sierra Leone does not deprive ECOMOG of the right
to defend its soldiers.' 2 5  Second, the combination of the Security Council
declaration of a threat to the peace in Resolution 1132 and the mass flow of
refugees across state borders could satisfy the "armed attack" requirement of
Article 51 for the individual neighboring states, which in turn would authorize
collective self-defense by ECOWAS. 126  The significant criticism of this
118. David Vesel, The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World, 18
BYU J. PuB. L. 1, 28-30 (2003).
119. S.C. Res. 1132, at pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/i 132 (Oct. 8,1997).
120. Id. 6, 8.
121. See id 8.
122. See supra, notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
123. See Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 53nd Sess., 3857th mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1998/5 (Feb. 26, 1998).
124. See Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 109, at 325, 332 (noting that RUF continued to
amputate limbs in order to bring about subservience through terror).
125. See id. at 366.
126. See S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 119, at pmbl.; see also Nowrot & Schabacker, supra note 109,
at 349-50.
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justification is the lack of proportionality. Any attack on ECOMOG troops most
certainly was outmatched by the use of warships and a complete invasion Sierra
Leone, although the attack was brief and may have been necessary to cease the
continuing threat of attacks from the RUF.
C. Application of Humanitarian Intervention Factors
The most significant analysis of the ECOWAS interventions is the
applicability of the factors described by Professor Ved P. Nanda.127 Although
most criteria are quite relevant and applicable, the purpose criterion is not as
important in the regional enforcement setting, and the collective / unilateral
distinction is moot.
1. Necessity
Neither Liberia nor Sierra Leone involved systematic violations before force
was considered and used, and the main source of necessity arose out of political
unrest rather than genocide. However, severe violations did occur in both cases
which probably warranted intervention on a humanitarian basis alone, regardless of
the other factors. Thus, in my opinion, the necessity criterion was fulfilled.
2. Proportionality
As discussed above, there were certainly some issues in proportionality
regarding the Sierra Leone intervention. But the main question here is what is
being compared? If the initial actions are viewed as displacing a legitimate
government, then the proportional response is restoration of that government.
However, if the standard is simply a cessation of human rights violations, then
offensive attacks against the perpetrators aren't warranted. The deciding factor for
my own analysis is the notion that violations of human rights perpetrated by
aggressors can typically only be stopped by offensive action in order to neutralize
the threat. Consequently, purely defensive measures would, in a practical sense,
never be effective and true proportionality could never be achieved. Thus the most
legally viable option is assessing the force allowed as compared to the force
imposed, which yields the result that proportionality was satisfied in both
ECOWAS interventions because force was only used to restore the incumbent
government.
3. Purpose
Despite the significance of intention in much of the law, 128 the purpose
requirement is not necessary with regard to collective intervention. The reason for
this is that the requirement of a purely humanitarian interest is used primarily as a
safe-guard against abuse of the humanitarian intervention doctrine as a cover for
other nefarious motives. However, in regional enforcement actions, the collective
will of the organization acts to mitigate extreme views and allows an objective
assessment of the conflict and the proper course of action. Consequently, the
127. See infra p. 12 and note 56.
128. For example, the doctrine of mens rea in the criminal law. Graeme Wood, Getting to the Very
Roots of Genocide, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 3, 2007 (reviewing Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil (2007)), available
at http://www.nysun.com/article/63837.
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purpose of the organization becomes somewhat irrelevant, which was subtly
demonstrated by the fact that ECOWAS intervened both times specifically to
restore peace and political stability, but the U.N. approved of the actions anyways.
ECOWAS's collective interpretation of the rationale for intervention will be
acceptable to the international community, absent extreme circumstances, because
regional enforcement transfers the subjective standard of unilateral action into an
objective standard of collective action.
4. Collective
Despite the prominence of Nigerian forces within ECOMOG, both
interventions were sufficiently collective because of the need for group decision at
the executive level of ECOWAS to employ force.
5. Maximization of Outcome
Both interventions clearly improved the situations in Liberia and Sierra Leone
regarding violations of human rights. However, one significant factor affecting the
outcome in Liberia is the doctrine of self-determination and the ability of the
people of Liberia to take control of their country away from an oppressive
government. Although Taylor's NPFL was not much of a beneficial alternative,
the sheer extent of his control over the territory in Liberia and the significant
portion of population that voted for him in the 1997 elections certainly support the
argument that the NPFL deserved to take legitimate control of Liberia through civil
unrest, which is not a violation of international law, but was precluded by unlawful
intervention in internal state matters.
In conclusion, each of the factors for humanitarian intervention was met in the
ECOWAS actions, and consequently those actions or other similar actions should
not be considered illegal, although technically they are under Article 2(4).
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon reflection of all the issues involved, there are three recommendations
that should be considered for future instances of regional intervention. First,
regional organizations should emphasize the trans-boundary effects of the
conflicts, such as border skirmishes or mass flows of refugees into foreign states.
The reason for this is these types of incidences give rise to the broad justification
of Article 51 self-defense as well as the traditional justifications for humanitarian
intervention. Although not technically an "armed attack," most trans-boundary
instances will be determined to be threats to the peace, which is usually sufficient
to satisfy the armed attack criteria. Moreover, identifying particular acts directed
or focused towards a member state of a regional organization provides more
legitimacy to the action as one of collective self-defense.
Second, regional organizations should increase the number of countries
involved militarily. Not only does it spread the cost and burden of intervention,
but also the mere fact that a multitude of countries has consented to the action
increases the legitimacy of the intervention as objectively reasonable. For
example, although the political and humanitarian justifications were slightly
stronger in the Sierra Leone intervention, the primary bordering on solitary role of
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the Nigerian government casts doubt on the action as unilateral rather than
collective force.
Third, a majority of the problems with legal justification for humanitarian
intervention would be alleviated by the formation of an objective U.N. committee
which could assess situations for human rights violations and recommend action
by the Security Council if possible or regional organizations if not. Thus, the
fundamental prohibition of illegal force could be maintained by the U.N. while still
accounting for the need for protection of human rights.

